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Introduction 
Ofra Magid or (2009, 2013, 2017) has presented a number of arguments that purport to show that category 
mistakes are meaningful. Most recently, in 2017, she presented two arguments (among others) that she 
claims produce this conclusion. She bases her conclusions, for each of these arguments, on assumptions 
that posit an intimate relationship between category mistakes and metaphorical utterances. One argument is 
based on the non-cognitivist approach to metaphor. The second argument is based on the cognitivist 
approach to metaphor and it comes in three flavours based on the work of: Paul Grice (1989), Josef Stem 
(2000, 2006), and Francois Recanati (2001, 2004). In this paper, I would like to introduce the first (non-
cognitivist) argument. It is fruitful to introduce this argument for the following reason: the argument 
assumes that some metaphorical utterances constitute category mistakes and it is this assumption that I wish 
to challenge. Since this assumption also seems to figure in Magidor's cognitivist arguments for category 
mistakes, there should be consequences for those arguments, too. Furthermore, I hope that we can learn 
more about the nature of the relationship between category mistakes and metaphor through our inquiry. 
Last, understanding the problems with Magidor's first argument suggests how it may be strengthened. 
However, this last project is not my concern here and will merely be mentioned in my concluding remarks. 
The paper proceeds in the following manner: First, I provide a condition that looks like it is entailed by 
both category mistakes and metaphors. This is, therefore, a necessary condition on category mistakes. Part 
of its job is to rule out utterances we might confuse for category mistakes. The other part of its job is to 
allow us a position from which to blur the distinction between category mistakes and metaphorical 
utterances, as Magidor would have us do. Second, I introduce Magidor's argument based on Donald 
Davidson's non-cognitivist understanding of metaphor. I, then, present a number of considerations that 
seem to undermine Magidor's argument. The emphasis is on showing that: there are no metaphorical 
utterances that are category mistakes and there are no category mistakes that are metaphorical utterances. 
I end by suggesting that there is a way to strengthen Magidor's argument. 
Category Mistakes 
Definitions of category mistakes are rare. Authors usually rely upon shared intuitions and examples. So, for 
example, Magidor (2014) starts her monograph on category mistakes without providing a formal definition 
of a category mistake. She justifies this by arguing that even without a formal definition there is a lot that 
can be learned about these kinds of error. We are introduced to category mistakes in her work through 
examples which are meant to combine with our intuitions. Again, Gilbert Ryle (2009) who popularised the 
analytic use of category mistakes in his influential analysis of mental phenomena did not provide us with a 
formal definition but relied on examples and our intuitions to introduce them. Perhaps, the first thinker to 
talk of them directly at the beginning of the 20th century (though not by name), was Edmund Husserl 
(2001). He put them forward for phenomenological analysis, but provided no formal definition. In part, I 
will follow this line insofar as I will not attempt to give sufficient conditions for a category mistake and will 
start by providing a set of examples. However, following this, I will augment my examples with what I take 
to be a necessary condition for category mistakes. 
First, then, let me introduce some examples: 
(I) Saturday is in bed (Ryle 1937) 
(2) Colourless green ideas sleep furiously (Chomsky 1957) 
(3) Relativity eats breakfast (Magidor 2009) 
These are standard and well known examples of sentences that we may commonly call category mistakes 
and that, I hope, meet our intuitions. 
1 Contact information: lukemalikosaka@,lang.osaka-u.ac. jp 
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Second, let me next introduce the condition on category mistakes that I hope will augment these examples 
and our intuitions about them. As said, such a condition has the virtue of allowing us a reason to say that 
the use of an arbitrary sentence is not a category mistake should the need arise. The condition draws upon 
Nelson Goodman's (1976) notion of a schema. A schema, S, is a set of related predicates, F, G, H, etc. 
Each predicate denotes a set of objects which do not intersect (relativized to, at the least, time). Examples 
of schemata are the colour-schema; temperature-schemata (Celsius, Fahrenheit, etc.); height-schemata 
(centimetres and metres, feet and inches, etc.); and so on.2 
Using this notion of schema, I think, the following is a necessary condition on category mistakes for a 
simple subject-predicate sentence: 
(C) If "A is F'is a simple subject-predicate sentence and Sis a schema, A is a subject term, and 
Fis a predicate that belongs to S, and F'is any other predicate that belongs to S, and al terms 
refer in some possible worlds, then an utterance of'A is F'involves a category mistake only if A 
denotes an object that fails to fal under F or F'for al substitutes of F'from Sin al possible 
worlds.3 
For short, I am going to refer to this condition as the schematic-trespass condition— this is because subject 
terms, like A above, seem to be associated with predicates of schema that they should not be associated 
with according to (C). The condition allows us to distinguish various sets of utterances which may look like 
category mistakes but which are not. Consider, for example, the following: 
(4) Water is mortal 
(5) Whales are fish 
(6) The Present Queen of France is 5ft 1 linches 
(7) Square circles are blue 
(8) Joe is a monomeric-polymer 
(4) looks like a category mistake, and, indeed, it is not ruled out by (C). (5) may look like a category 
mistake, but is ruled out by (C) since whales fal under predicates of the scheme to which the predicate 
、 fish'belongs—the scheme that classifies animals. (6) is not a category mistake because in some world it is 
true (that is we can imagine a context of use in which the terms of (6) refer). (7) is not a category mistake 
because it contains a subject term that doesn't refer in any world. (8) is not a category mistake because it 
contains a predicate term that does not refer in any world. 4 
However, let us note, the condition does not distinguish utterances we might think are category mistakes 
and metaphorical. Consider: 
(9) Time crawls 
This is a sentence that may look like a category mistake and it involves a schematic-trespass. Therefore, we 
cannot rule it out as a category mistake by (C). Obviously, (9) has a standard metaphorical use. Thus, we 
have an example of a sentence that looks like it will result in a category mistake yet is used to make 
metaphorical utterance. This brings us to Magidor's argument for the meaningfulness of category mistakes, 
which relies on the coexistence of category mistakes with metaphorical utterances. 
Magidor: The Non-Cognitivist Approach to Metaphor and Category Mistakes 
2 Cf. Pap, A. 1960. 
3 Cf. Malik (2018, forthcoming). Alternative phrasing may exchange the expression "possible world(s)" with "possible 
context(s) of use". 
4 The schematic-trespass condition, (C), rules these sentences out matching my intuitions about what we want to characterise 
as a category mistakes. If your intuitions are different, the condition in question can be altered to meet them. 
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Magidor divides accounts of metaphor into cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts. Non-cognitivist 
accounts claim that there are no metaphorical meanings and if an utterance that contains a metaphor has 
any meaning at al, it is the literal meaning alone. The view is attributed to Donald Davidson (1978). 
Magidor puts it like this: 
According to non-cognitivism, originally proposed by Donald Davidson, while utterances of 
metaphors can certainly have a communicative purpose and produce various effects in hearers, 
these effects are not achieved via the expression of a metaphorical meaning. According to 
Davidson, the only content that is expressed by an utterance of a metap~or is its literal one, and it 
is grasp of this literal meaning or content that produces in hearers vanous metaphorical effects 
such as conjuring various associations or drawing attention to various likenesses (Magidor 2017: 
67). 
One way, then, to look upon Davidson's theory of metaphor is to see it as a single-meaning theory of 
metaphor as opposed to a double-meaning theory of metaphor. A single-meaning theory of metaphor 
associates one and only one meaning with a sentence that is used metaphorically: the literal meaning. A 
double-meaning theory of metaphor associates two meanings with a sentence that is used metaphorically: 
the literal meaning and the metaphorical meaning. Denying metaphorical meaning to the use of a sentence 
used for a metaphorical purpose, for Davidson, is to deny dual meanings to a sentence or the instance of its 
use. But, as Magidor rightly contends, this does not deny that that sentence or its use generates effects 
associations and likenesses that extend beyond the literal meaning of the sentence in question. Indeed, the 
literality that Davidson insists upon can be found in cognitivist approaches to metaphor―which rely on 
literal meaning to generate the types of effect mentioned. An example is Martinich (1984) who develops a 
distinctly Gricean approach to metaphor. So, for example, with an explicit nod to Davidson, Martinich 
emphasises that when moving from conventional sentence meaning to metaphorical utterance meaning, 
reference to literal meaning is a requisite. More recent contemporary cognitivists seem to reject both kinds 
of philosophical theory at certain levels. For example, such accounts may: (a) reject non-cognitivism by 
accepting metaphorical meanings; yet, (b) reject classical philosophical cognitivism for taking 
metaphorical meanings as secondaか meanings(cf. Glucksberg 2008). However, it is not my intention to 
compare and contrast Davidson's theory in any more detail, here. Rather, it is Magidor's use of it that I 
wish to outline. 
Once Magidor has introduced Davidson's theory, she very quickly concludes that the theory shows that 
category mistakes are meaningful: 
The crucial point for current purposes is that on Davidson's view, what brings about the 
metaphorical effect is grasp of the literal meaning of the sentence. This entails that in order for a 
sentence to be used successfully as a metaphor, it must be literally meaningful. But this entails that 
metaphors which constitute category mistakes must also be literally meaningful, contrary to the 
meaningless view (Magidor 2017: 67). 
To add more detail to Magidor's presentation, we might speak in the following terms: First of al, of course, 
it cannot be assumed that al utterances that are metaphorical are utterances that involve category mistakes. 
There are examples of utterances that express metaphors that do not involve any kind of category 
mistake utterances that could be or could have been true (we will see some examples later). Second, it 
cannot follow that because utterances that express metaphors are literally meaningful that al sentences that 
contain category mistakes are meaningful. This does not follow on the grounds that some sentences that 
contain category mistakes are not metaphors. For example, as presented in Magidor (2009): 
(lO)Relativity eats breakfast. 
She asks us not to take this sentence metaphorically. If this is possible, which it seems to be, this suggests 
that, indeed, there are sentences that may involve category mistakes but fail to be metaphorical. 
On the other hand, there are non-obvious category mistakes, which are not easily diagnosed. These only 
meet with our attention after some kind of close analysis— for example, after we find that a paradox, 
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contradiction, or absurdity has emerged. Ryle (2009) turned his attention to this type of category mistake in 
his book The Concept of Mind. Whether or not Ryle was correct to think that statements like the following: 
(11)Minds and bodies exist (Ryle 2009) 
include latent category mistakes, I do not think it is implausible to think that non-obvious category mistakes 
do exist. In many cases, if not al, I presume that such mistakes are not obvious because we think of the 
sentences and the utterances that express them as possibly or actually true一 (11)would be a case in point 
for many of us if it were actually a category mistake. In any case, I will take it that that not al category 
mistakes are metaphorical if any are and, hence, that not al category mistakes can be shown by Magidor's 
argument to be meaningful if any can. 
To get back to Magidor's argument, Magidor says, "metaphors which constitute category mistakes must 
also be literally meaningful". That suggests that Magidor thinks there are some sentences that are used to 
express metaphors that are also category mistakes. Taking al we've said on board, her argument might be 
reconstructed like this: 
1. Utterances expressing metaphors are either false, true, or category mistakes. 
2. Utterances expressing metaphors are literally meaningful. 
3. Therefore, utterances that express metaphors that are neither false nor true are category mistakes 
and literally meaningful. 
The assumption is that it is possible for utterances that express metaphors to contain category mistakes. I 
will dispute this assumption. It is argued here that if an utterance expresses a metaphor it cannot constitute 
a category mistake and vice versa. The set of utterances that are both metaphorical and category mistakes 
is, therefore, empty. 
Thesis and Form of Argument 
We want to show: 
(Thesis) If an utterance expresses a metaphor, it cannot involve a category mistake; and if an 
utterance involves a category mistake, it cannot express a metaphor. 
To judge whether the thesis can be held, it will be helpful to point to some differences between utterances 
that involve category mistakes and utterances that express metaphors. These differences must be 
differences that mean category mistakes and metaphorical utterances are, actually, mutually exclusive in 
respect of those differences. The form an argument needs to take in order to defend the thesis will look 
something like this: 
1. Metaphors entail F 
2. Category mistakes entail the negation of F 
3. Therefore, metaphors entail the absence of category mistakes and vice versa. 
Below a number of differences are examined to see if such an argument can be developed. This will 
ground the major claim of this article. 
Attitudes 
Consider the following three examples of metaphorical use from Davidson, Searle, and Martinich: 
(12)Hemingway lost in Africa (Davidson 1978) 
(13)Disraeli climbs the greasy pole (Searle 1981) 
(14)She is a princess (Martinich 1984) 
The first was a newspaper headline that expressed a metaphor but became true, according to Davidson. 
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The second expresses a metaphor but could have been true, according to John Searle. The last might be 
true and metaphorical at the same time, according to Martinich―he imagines Princess Grace talking 
about her daughter in that way. Martinich says that it is a struggle to think of examples like the 
aforementioned. Perhaps, though, this is a ubiquitous one: 
(15)He is an animal. 
In any case, what al this shows is that a sentence recognised as a metaphorical utterance need neither be 
necessarily false nor merely false. On the other hand, the aforementioned theorists claim that recognising 
or using a sentence to make a metaphorical utterance, does require one to treat it as if it were false. 
Turning now to category mistakes, while recognising that an utterance contains a category mistake 
requires, at the least, understanding that it is false, making a genuine category mistake does not— rather, 
speaking intuitively, it seems to me that making a genuine category mistake with a sentence requires 
treating that sentence as true. Thus, let S be a sentence that contains a schematic-trespass. If the intuition, 
aforementioned, is correct, then we can propose the following: 
If a person, J, makes a category mistake by using S, then J is treating S as if it is true. If J uses S 
to say something metaphorically, then J is treating S as if it is false. If J cannot treat S as if it is 
both true and false at any given time, t, then when J uses S, J either makes a category mistake 
with Sor says something metaphorically, but not both. 
So, the question now becomes is it possible to treat a sentence as both true and false at a given time? And 
is this possible with sentences like S that contain schematic-trespasses that are related to making a 
category mistake and expressing metaphor? We can answer the first question in the affirmative, because 
we know that Hegelians and dialetheists treat some statements as true and false (e.g. Priest 1984). For 
example, for Priest the following sentence-known as a Liar sentence— will be both true and false: 
(16)(16) is false. 
If this sentence is true, then it is false; though if it is false, then it is true. We could assign an undefined 
value to (16) by allowing for a three-valued semantical analysis of that sentence (cf. Kripke 1975). The 
problem with that, however, is that it leads to similar outcomes for similar kinds of sentences, for 
example: 
(17)(17) is false or undefined 
If (17) is true, then it is false or undefined (i.e. not true); if (17) is false, then it is true (i.e. not false); if 
(17) is undefined, then it is true (i.e. defined) (cf. Rieger 2001). Based on similar lines of thought, Priest 
concludes this shows that (16) should be thought of as true and false. Priest takes the Liar as indicative of 
a broader class of sentence— those that just are true and false. Thus, we cannot provide a positive answer 
to the first question, which is what we would require in order to follow the form of our desired argument 
and draw a conclusion that would support the stated thesis. 
The answer to the second question, I think, is not cut and dry. If it is negative, as I think it is, we will be 
able to say something like: It is not possible to treat what a sentence like S says as true and false when 
used to express a metaphor, rather it must be treated as false. Nor is it possible to treat what a sentence 
like S says as true and false when making a genuine category mistake, rather it must be treated as true. On 
that basis, attitudes to sentences are sufficient to distinguish metaphorical utterances from category 
mistakes in the way we want. However, if the answer to the second question above is even in part positive, 
we may seem to face difficulties. Consider the following sentence: 
(18) Quadruplicity drinks procrastination (Russell 1940) 
The perceived challenge may go like this: 
1. So far as (18) is treated as if it is false, it is being used metaphorically 
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2. So far as (18) is treated as if it is true, it involves a category mistake 
3. At a given time, t, (18) is treated as both true and false 
4. Therefore, at t, (18) is used metaphorically and involves a category mistake. 
The difficulty, I think, can be countered. 
Acquiescing to Davidson, as Magidor would have us do, we may assume that: if we take (18) to be 
metaphorical, we will need to treat it as if it was false but not true— there is nothing in Davidson account 
of metaphor (or meaning) that suggests any other course of action. Then, we may modify the condition we 
set out above thus: let S be a sentence that contains a schematic-trespass. If, now, a person, J, makes a 
category mistake by using S, then J is treating S as if it is true, or true and false. If J uses S to say 
something metaphorically, then J is treating Sas if it is false, or false but not true. Then: 
(a) If J cannot treat Sas if it is both true and false at any given time, t, then when J uses S, J either 
makes a category mistake with Sor says something metaphorically, but not both. 
(b) But, likewise, if J cannot treat Sas if it is (i) both true and false, and (i) false but not true at any 
given time, t, then when J uses S, J either makes a category mistake with S or says something 
metaphorically, but not both. 
It is clear that even if the first claim (i.e. (a)) fails, the later claim (i.e. (b)) does not. Thus, even if(l8) is 
treated as both true and false, and that involves a category mistake, we may stil insist that category 
mistakes exclude metaphorical uses as metaphorical uses exclude category mistakes. 5 It follows, then, that 
we have a reason to think that the thesis posted above is correct and Magidor's assumption is false.6 
Phenomenology 
Another reason to think that metaphorical utterances and utterances that contain category mistakes are 
different is phenomenological, that is, we experience each differently. We experience utterances when we 
understood them to be used metaphorically as meaningful or with clarity; but we experience utterances 
that are not used metaphorically, when we understand them to be category mistakes, as meaningless or 
with bafflement. Of course, we can assume with Ryle (2009) that there are non-obvious category mistakes, 
category errors we do not understand as errors. We can also assume the relevant uses are not taken 
metaphorically— for why would they be if we take them to be saying something that is merely literal and 
true. We may not experience these mistakes as meaningless or with bafflement, though, if we do, it is not 
because we understand them to be category mistakes. If so, so far as the use of a sentence Sis taken to be 
either a metaphorical use or a use that culminates in a category mistake then: if S is understood 
metaphorically, it is experienced as meaningful or with clarity; if Sis understood non-metaphorically, it is 
experienced as meaningless or found obscure. If S cannot be experienced as both meaningful/clear and 
meaningless/obscure, then S cannot be experienced as a metaphor and category mistake at the same time. 
Perhaps, there is the possibility of supporting this thc~sis experimentally. First, for example, we may look 
at responses to metaphorical utterances and obvious category mistakes under controlled conditions, in 
order to establish a statistical difference. Second, if phenomenological meaning is embodied, as some 
authors contend, then there may be a real bodily difference between how metaphorical utterances are 
processed and how utterances that are understood as category mistakes are processed. Embodied-
5 I have to admit, it is dificult to think of conditions in which the antecedent conditions would prevail. 
6 By way of clarification: Al this is, of course, not to say that we cannot treat (18) as if it is false. For example, we may 
suppose it is false in order to derive a contradiction, etc. However, in this case we wil not be making a category mistake. 
We may, further, deny the sentence is true, which may comm itus to the truth of the negation of (18). In that case, I take it 
we are making a category mistakes, but it is a different category mistake from the one where (18) is taken to be true since, 
that is, it is a category mistake involving a different sentence (to wit. the negation of (18)). We might, as some have done 
for semantic reasons (Martin 1975; cf. Magidor 2009), treat (18) as if it is undefined; this, to, does not result in a category 
mistake— this may, however, beg the question against Magidor's argument, so it is best avoided. 
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phenomenology is, also, in principle, testable and, thus, the mooted difference verifiable (or falsifiable, as 
you like) (Cf. Gibbs, 2008) 
Literal and Connotative Properties 
Davidson thinks that metaphors necessarily make us attend to some likeness (Davidson 1978: 33). But he 
argues that metaphors and similes can be distinguished by the fact that metaphors are nearly always false 
but similes are always true (in the trivial sense that everything is like everything else under some aspect). 
We may add, a simile often helps to explain a metaphor (even when it is merely a perceived or 
conventional likeness). For example, consider: 
(19)Richard is a gorilla 
(20)Richard is like a gorilla 
(19) is meant to suggest Richard is violent, aggressive, etc. But, according to Searle (1981) and Martinich 
(1984), gorillas are not like that. Stil, (20) makes sense of(19) on the basis of a perceived or conventional 
association. We may try to capture this more fully in the following way: 
(21)Richard fals under some of the predicates (rightly or wrongly) that are often or conventionally 
associated with a gorilla 
How about category mistakes? First of al, somewhat similarly to metaphorical utterances, category 
mistakes are necessarily false (if not meaningless), but any simile generated by a category mistake (see (23) 
below) is necessarily true. On the other hand, dissimilarly, such mistakes do not seem to direct us to some 
likeness. More to the point, I assume, similes and statements like (21) are no help in explaining more about 
the meaning of an utterance that involves a category mistake. So consider the following set of sentences: 
(22)Donald's idea is square 
(23)Donald's idea is like a square 
(24)Donald's idea fals under some of the predicates (rightly or wrongly) that are often or 
conventionally associated with a square 
The sentences (23) and (24) won't help much in understanding (22) if (22) is being used in an attempt to 
make a merely literal and true statement about Donald's idea―which, as stated above, it seems a sentence 
that culminates in a non-obvious category mistake is attempting to do. 
The difference between a metaphor and category mistake may, then, be presented in the following terms. 
Consider the term'a square'. It has both a merely literal meaning as represented, in table. I, by its essential 
properties and, on the other hand, it has a set of stereotypical meanings as represented, in table. I, by its 
connotations. Now consider the sentence: 
(25)Milhous is a square 
Table.I. 
…ISA SQUARE 
ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES I C onnotatzons 
A SHAPE WITH FOUR SIDES OF EQUAL Boring 
LENGTH I Conservative 
Lacking in difference 
Uniform 
We shall assume the sentence (25) is essentially false, for it is not possible for Milhous (assuming he is 
human) to be a (literal) square. We shall assume, next, even though, at the least, (25) is literally false, its 
metaphorical use tels us, as a kind of pragmatic imperative, to connect Milhous to some of the 
connotative terms but not to the essential meaning―or prioritise the former over the later. We shall 
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further assume, even though (25) is literally false, a categorical use, again pragmatically, urges us to 
connect Milhous to the essential meanings and not to the connotative terms— or prioritise the former over 
the later. Since the metaphorical use of (25) requires us to do something the categorical use of (25) 
prohibits and vice versa, and we can't do both at the same time, again, the presence of a metaphorical use 
of (25) should eliminate the categorical use, and the accompanying error, and vice versa. 
This argument needn't be taken to show Davidson's general picture of metaphor is flawed. What we have 
said may be consistent with Davidson's approach to metaphor, for the categorical imperative may tel us 
to stop at the literal meaning or prioritise it (where the literal meaning = the essential meaning); the 
metaphorical imperative may tel us to proceed to, or prioritise, its connotative meanings, or associations 
and likenesses, only after recognition of the literal sense— since, perhaps, the former can only proceed 
after the later. All this is consistent with Davidson's view and Magidor's presentation of it. 
Failure and Success 
Davidson says that a metaphor is never unsuccessful (Davidson 1978: 31). There are no metaphorical 
utterances that fail, there are just degrees of artistic success (Davidson 1978: 31). This is quite different for 
an assertion that involves a category mistake, for misuse is central to it; a category mistake is, after al, a 
mistake. So, we might say, there are no category mistakes that succeed, there are just degrees of ailure (in 
that some category mistakes are obviously category mistakes but others are not so noticeable which 
brings us nicely back into contact with Ryle's approach). We may build on this point in the following way. 
Let U = a metaphorical utterance and T = a category mistake. Suppose U and T share a sentential base, S, 
and suppose S contains a schematic-trespass. Then, it seems valid to say that U entails a schematic-
trespass, and, likewise, it is valid to say T entails the same schematic-trespass. However, in the first case, 
the trespass enables communicative content; but, in the second case, the trespass obscures communicative 
content. It follows, given enabling communicative content and obfuscation of content exclude each other, 
that U excludes T as T excludes U Thus, it follows, on a single occasion of use, the category mistake or 
the metaphorical use that is conveyed by S will take precedence at the expense of the other. Another way 
to make the point is that Uhas success conditions that amount to failure conditions for T contained in the 
very structure of S, where success entails the communication of content in virtue of the schematic-trespass, 
and failure entails the obfuscation of content just because of the schematic-trespass. 
Conclusion 
There are, then, sufficient reasons to thi油thatcategory mistakes and metaphorical utterances are not only 
distinct, but the presence of a category mistake must exclude the presence of a metaphorical utterance, as 
the presence of a metaphorical utterance must exclude the presence of a category mistake, even if the two 
occurrences exploit the same sentential base. 
Closing Remarks 
But, perhaps, talking of a sentential base suggests there is another argument in the vicinity favourable to 
Magidor's conclusions. Again, let U = a metaphorical utterance and T = a category mistake. Suppose U 
and T share a sentential base, S, and suppose S contains a schematic-trespass. This implies that U entails a 
schematic-trespass, and that T entails the same sch1~matic-trespass. At the same time, let S be literally 
meaningful just in case S can be used for U (not merely when it is used for U). Then, it follows that T is 
literally meaningful. This is the argument that Magiclor should have made—or made explicit if it was the 
argument she was making. However, there are stil obstacles to be overcome and clarifications to be made. 
First, it might be that a single vehicle (sentential in this case) may deliver two distinct objects (metaphor 
and category mistake) each bearing inimical properties (meaningfulness and meaninglessness)―we have 
already argued for cases in which it is clear that a sentence, S, may deliver a metaphorical utterance at a 
time, t, and a category mistake at a second time, t+, where each instance or use of S bears inimical 
properties. These properties were related to the attitudes, the phenomenology, the practical requirements, 
and the success and failure conditions associated with sentences like S and their structure. 
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Second, a more general question remains— how do category mistakes fit into Davidson's broader musings 
on language? A litle more specifically: Is Davidson's truth based theory of meaning compatible with 
category mistakes being meaningful? That is a pressing question. If a Davidson like theory of meaning 
which is very particular (including, as it does, a Tarski based theory of truth at its foundation (Davidson 
2001)) cannot accommodate category mistakes, th,~n the strengthened argument will fail, for at best, a 
sentence, S, delivering a metaphorical utterance at time t and a category mistake at time t+ will bear 
meaning at t but be meaningless at t+. At worst, if one holds that a sentence like S if meaningless at t+ is 
meaningless at t, then Davidson's theory of metaphor will be undercut. On the other hand, I suspect, if a 
decision on Davidson's theory of meaning is needed before the strengthened argument can get going, and 
the theory does, indeed, turn out to accommodate category mistakes, the metaphorical use of a sentence 
like Swill be entirely incidental to the strengthened argument above since Davidson's theory of meaning 
alone will already have established that category mistakes are meaningful. 
A last comment: We might develop our analysis of category mistakes by identifying category mistakes 
with the uses of a sentence like S, not directly with the structure of S. Rather, schematic trespassing is 
associated directly with the structure of S. Thus, it isn't a sentence per se that is a category mistakes; it is 
the use of a sentence, like S, that, in the first instance, contains a schematic-trespass, and that, secondly, is 
not used figuratively. Perhaps, this provides sufficiency to the schematic trespass condition noted above. 
Perhaps, this also suggests that category mistakes do not emerge at the level of grammar―schematic 
trespasses do. Such structure allows for S to be used metaphorically, but it also allows for S to be misused 
categorically, and each use excludes the other, at any given time. If, further, sentences that contain 
schematic trespasses culminate sometimes in category mistakes slot into, for example, a Davidson like 
theory of meaning, then we may take them as semantically meaningful (whether they end up as 
metaphorical flourishes or categorical errors). What, then, really distinguishes the use of a sentence like S 
for a metaphor from a category mistake is, based on the above, how it is treated, how it is experienced, 
how its structure— in terms of the schematic-trespass— is treated, and what that implies or requires us to 
do. These may be considered pragmatic realities. All this may stil be consistent with deeming an 
established category mistake as noise: logically, practically, and phenomenologically meaningless. 
These are interesting lines of inquiry— none wholly supportive ofMagidor. However, today's inquiry was 
aimed at presenting arguments that demonstrate that the intersection of metaphorical utterances and 
category mistakes is empty. This, I take it, has been done. 
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